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1. What Kind of a Test? With How Many Prongs?
In their latest post on this blog, Petra Bárd and Wouter van Ballegooij commented on the
AG Tanchev Opinion delivered in the Case C‑216/18 PPU, Minister for Justice and Equality
v LM. The preliminary reference from the Irish High Court concerns the possibility to
surrender a crime suspect to Poland despite the controversial judicial reforms in this
country. The authors claim that the legal problem in the case at hand should be framed –
contrary to what AG Tanchev proposed – as a rule of law and not a fundamental rights
issue. They suggest that the Court of Justice follow rather its approach from Associação
Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses and assess the Polish judicial system in light of the
requirements of judicial independence.
Instead, AG Tanchev opted for a different, “fundamental rights” approach from Aranyosi
and Căldăraru. He agreed that the potential breach of the right to fair trial can be the basis
to postpone the execution of the European Arrest Warrant. He opined however that the
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executing judicial authority should engage in a two-stage examination to find not only that
(1) there are systemic deficiencies in the issuing judicial system but also (2) that the person
concerned is actually exposed to such a risk because she is a political opponent. This
approach causes multiple problems, some of which are discussed by the authors
mentioned above with which I fully concur. Judicial systems of EU Member States should
be constructed in a way to exclude any interferences in the judicial decision-making. To
require of the accused to prove that such interferences may occur for whatever reasons
(e.g. because the executive thinks that drug traffickers or those who bring their cases
before the Court of Justice should be punished in an exceptionally severe way) is to
introduce an impossible burden of proof.
In this post, I focus on what I believe is the most important question in the Celmer case:
what kind of a test for the rule of law/fair trial, and with how many prongs? I argue that the
rule of law/fair trial test that the Court should apply is the test for the appearance of
independence, known from the practice of the ECtHR. I also argue that the Court should
not leave the application of this test to the referring court but carry it out by itself.
2. Why pushing for Aranyosi and Căldăraru test?
AG Tanchev did not propose a reformulation of the questions referred and accepted the
way in which the main legal problem had been framed – i.e. as a mutatis mutandis
application of Aranyosi and Căldăraru test. This framing directed the reasoning and efforts
of AG Tanchev on the adjustment of that test. He focused on the maximum limitation of
exceptions to mutual trust on fundamental rights grounds in order to secure the
effectiveness of mutual recognition system. But he underestimated the difference between
the fundamental right at issue in Aranyosi and Căldăraru – i.e. the protection from inhuman
and degrading treatment while being in prison – and the one in Celmer – i.e. the right to a
fair trial. The prison conditions may vary in a State and prisoners may be transferred from
one prison to another. That is why systemic problems with prison conditions do not
necessarily mean that the prisoner will be subjected to degrading treatment. Hence, the
Aranyosi and Căldăraru test has a second “concrete” prong. The executing judicial authority
must find that the very individual against sought by means of the EAW is likely to
experience degrading treatment.
On the contrary, the controversial judicial reforms affect all Polish judges to a comparable
extent. In a nutshell, these measures enhance the powers of the Minister of Justice to
oversee the functioning of common courts. As concerns likely effects of these measures on
concrete judicial decisions, the Court should take a closer look to the new system of
disciplinary proceedings for judges. The Minister can effectively initiate disciplinary
proceedings against any judge, appoint an accuser and even issue binding instructions to
latter. He also selects judges who serve in disciplinary courts. Moreover, the new Council
of Judiciary – elected by the parliamentary majority and not judges themselves – will now
decide on the membership of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court. Importantly,
the content of a judicial decision containing a “manifest breach of law” may also amount to
a disciplinary offence. Although this is not a new measure, the possibility to punish or
dismiss a judge for the content of her decisions is no more subject to strong procedural
guarantees, in particular regarding the independence of disciplinary courts. Moreover, M.
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Matczak reported on this blog (see the Facts 6 and 7) about the judgment after which the
Deputy Minister of Justice was publicly considering disciplinary proceedings for criminal
judges who refused to accept the fruits of a poisonous tree, relying directly on the Polish
Constitution and the ECHR. The new structure of disciplinary courts and proceedings may
create at last a “freezing effect” on all Polish judges. It “encourages” them to follow in their
decision-making the preferences of the executive.
In what way should this be considered by the Court? I believe that instead of adjusting the
Aranyosi and Căldăraru test, the Court of Justice should perform a test for the appearance
of independence.
3. The Appearance (of Independence) Matter
The appearance of independence test is applied by the ECtHR. The idea for this test is
summarised in the legal maxime: “justice must not only be done, it must also be seen to be
done”. In the Case 22678/93, Incal, the ECtHR held:
“Even appearances may be of a certain importance. What is at stake is the confidence which
the courts in a democratic society must inspire in the public and above all, as far as criminal
proceedings are concerned, in the accused (…). In deciding whether there is a legitimate
reason to fear that a particular court lacks independence or impartiality, the standpoint of the
accused is important without being decisive. What is decisive is whether his doubts can be
held to be objectively justified (…).” (para 71).
Arguably, this approach has also been endorsed by the Court of Justice in the Case C-
175/11, H. & D. v Refugee Applications Commissioner. In this case, the Court was called to
assess the independence of the Refugee Appeals Tribunal. The applicants in the main
proceedings submitted that the Tribunal was not independent, as organisational links exist
between the Tribunal and the Minister of Justice. The Court held that:
“[the] guarantees of independence and impartiality require rules, particularly as regards the
composition of the body and the appointment, length of service and the grounds for abstention,
rejection and dismissal of its members, in order to dispel any reasonable doubt in the minds of
individuals as to the imperviousness of that body to external factors and its neutrality with
respect to the interests before it.” (para. 97)
The point is to verify whether the parties to judicial proceedings and members of the public
have any objectively justified grounds to doubt the independence of the court (for another
example of the application of this test, see Case 42856/06, Kinský v the Chech Republic, in
particular paras. 95-97). The test is underpinned by the idea that no one is able to
penetrate the mental sphere of a judge to get to know and evaluate the real motives of her
decisions, and whether she was truly independent and impartial. The best we can do is to
create an institutional and procedural setting in which the only interest of judges lies in
deciding cases to the best of their abilities. Such a setting must be understandable to
citizens and provide them with strong grounds to believe in judicial independence, the core
building block of judicial legitimacy. With judicial independence we associate the highest
achievable level of objectivity. If the courts of EU Member States are all protected by
appropriate legal arrangements from undue interferences from the legislative and the
3/5
executive, the parties to judicial proceedings and the EU citizenry in general have
reasonable grounds to believe that judicial decisions are as objective as possible. Hence,
they are likely to treat them as binding sources of legitimate authority. The lack of
appearance of judicial independence result in the lack of mutual trust between the EU
Member States.
The test that the Court should apply in Celmer boils down to the following questions. Does
a reasonable observer or a party to proceedings before the Polish courts – being aware of
the recently introduced measures regarding, among others, the Minister of Justice’s
powers to initiate and coordinate disciplinary proceedings against judges – have objectively
justified grounds to doubt that her or his case will be decided exclusively on the basis of the
court’s best understanding of applicable law? Or does she or he have reasonable grounds
to suspect that the court’s decision may be influenced by some factors external to law, for
instance political preferences of the legislative or executive, even without the latter’s direct
interferences, just due to the ‘freezing effect’?
3. A Hot Potato
AG Tanchev suggested that the Court should leave the final decision on the possibility of a
fair trial in Poland to the referring court. On the contrary, I believe that the appearance of
justice test should be carried out by the Court of Justice itself. Due to the differences
between the judicial systems of EU Member States, an application of the appearance of
justice test will necessarily result in clarifications regarding the EU standards of judicial
independence. Each time the test is applied, new elements of the EU standards of judicial
independence emerge. At the same time, certain legal arrangements are prohibited to all
EU Member States and the scope of admissible interferences into the judicial branch by
political branches is narrowed down. In other words, an application of the test implies the
new interpretation of EU law. The latter is an exclusive task and responsibility of the Court
of Justice. It would be different only if the application of the test required some case-
specific and not only systemic considerations. But alas for the Court of Justice, the
appearance of independence test should have only one prong – there should be no dividing
line between the systemic and case-specific considerations. To require the person
concerned to prove that the court of the issuing Member State hearing her case after the
execution of the EAW will lack independence – where we already know of serious systemic
deficiencies of this State’s judicial system in terms of its independence – is to charge this
person with an impossible burden of proof.
At this point, it becomes clear that proceedings under Article 7 TEU and proceedings
before the Court of Justice in the Celmer case indeed do have the same or at least very
similar subject-matter, contrary to what AG Tanchev stated (para. 40 et seq.). But in no
way does it mean that the Court could usurp powers conferred by Article 7 TEU upon the
European Council and the Council. The questions referred by the Irish High Court are a
normal consequence of the recognition in the EU legal order of fundamental rights,
including the right to a fair trial. Even though the Court may be called to assess the
independence of Polish courts, the Celmer judgment in will impose obligations of the Irish
High Court, under the EAW Framework Decision and Article 47 of the Charter. Moreover,
that the Court may be called to assess the independence of the Polish judicial system as a
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whole stems from the nature of the right to a fair trial and the controversial legal framework
which affects all Polish judges to a comparable extent. Again, in no way is the Court’s task
and competence in Celmer incompatible with Article 7 TEU.
The Celmer case is one in which the function of the Court of Justice as the constitutional
and rule of law court of the EU is clearly visible. I hope that the Court of Justice will properly
acknowledge this case’s distinctiveness.
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